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Abstract 
This article attempts to disentangle the determinants of the adoption of renewable energy support policies 
in developing and emerging countries. By analyzing policies already implemented in industrialized 
countries, we focus on the diffusion but not the invention of climate-relevant policies. We look at four 
different types of policies (renewable energy targets, feed-in tariffs, other financial incentives and 
framework policies) and consider both domestic factors and international diffusion mechanisms utilizing a 
discrete-time events history model with a logit link on a self-compiled dataset of grid-based electricity 
policy adoption in 112 developing and emerging countries from 1998 to 2009. In general, we find stronger 
support for the domestic determinants of policy adoption, but also substantial influence of international 
factors. Countries with a larger population and more wealth have a higher probability of adopting 
renewable energy policies. Only in some specific cases do natural endowments for producing renewable 
energy encourage governments to adopt policies, and hydro power resources even correlate negatively 
with the adoption of targets. Among the international determinants, emulation from colonial peers and 
membership within the EU seem to facilitate policy adoption. International climate finance is less relevant, 
as the Global Environmental Facility and the Clean Development Mechanism may only increase the 
adoption of frameworks and targets, but they have no influence on tariffs and incentives.  
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Climate policy innovation in the South - domestic and international determinants of renewable 
energy policies in developing and emerging countries 
 
1. Introduction 
Energy generation and use is one of the most important global sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. Electricity and heat production accounted for 28% of global emissions in 2005 (WRI, 2012). 
Renewable energy (RE) is increasingly considered by policy-makers as a key energy form to support and 
pursue, not only to prevent climate change, but also to improve energy security, reduce local air pollution 
and generate employment (Mitchell et al., 2011). In addition, as Jordan and Huitema (forthcoming) point 
out in the introduction to this special issue, the sustained failure to reach an effective international 
agreement to tackle climate change is resulting in a shift of attention – and of expectations – towards 
national-level policy-making. For these reasons, in this article we focus on the national adoption of 
policies that support RE electricity generation. 
There is a growing body of literature that focuses on the international diffusion and national adoption of 
policies that financially support or otherwise promote the deployment of RE, such as feed-in tariffs 
(FITs), renewable portfolio standards or tax credits. Most of the empirical literature, however, looks at 
industrialized countries or at subnational units in industrialized countries (Huang et al., 2007; Jacobs, 
forthcoming; Matisoff, 2008; Vachon and Menz, 2006). Empirical work on RE policies in developing 
countries mostly focuses on the policies’ impact (Lewis and Wiser, 2007; Wang et al., 2010; Yu et al., 
2009), whereas literature on policy adoption is limited to few case studies (e.g. Benecke, 2009). We are not 
aware of literature that looks at policy diffusion in the area of RE in developing countries, even though 
recent literature has emphasized the role of international competition in the related field of carbon capture 
and storage (Roman, 2011). 
However, knowing the determinants that encourage developing and emerging1 country governments to 
adopt RE policies is very important from an international climate policy perspective; they already generate 
more than half of global GHG emissions, will substantively expand their power generation facilities in the 
next few decades and are, therefore, projected to contribute more than 70% of energy-related GHG 
missions by 2035 (IEA, 2010). Whether policy adoption determinants are the same as in industrialized 
countries is questionable, given the difference in political systems, international commitments to mitigate 
climate change, and economic development. For instance, the rapid growth in emerging economies at a 
time of high oil prices may have encouraged the search for alternative energy forms. Furthermore, less 
affluent countries may need international financial and capacity building support to implement RE 
technologies with high investment costs. Therefore, we can expect that international climate finance, both 
from public sources and the carbon market will help to set up new policies. If we find such an effect, then 
we can argue that the international community has effective tools to promote national-level policy 
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development in support of climate change mitigation in developing and emerging countries, and this can 
in turn inform the scholarly debate on international climate change governance. However, according to 
our knowledge, all these potential differences between developing and developed country policy adoption 
have not yet been analyzed. 
This article starts filling this research gap by analysing the reasons why developing and emerging countries 
adopt RE support policies. Policies are understood here as national-level public policies, i.e. government 
decisions (Dye, 1972) on goals or means (Jenkins, 1978). Among the three aspects of climate policy 
innovation - invention, diffusion and impact of climate policies (Jordan and Huitema, forthcoming), we 
focus on the diffusion of policies already in place in other countries, as most of the RE policies observed 
in developing countries have been invented in the North (REN21, 2007). Thereby, we follow Walker’s 
concept of policy innovation as first-time adoption of a policy in a country (Walker, 1969, p. 881). Walker’s policy 
innovation concept of one-time legislative adoption is of course a simplication, as policies are composed 
of a set of interrelated decisions (Jenkins, 1978). In reality, only the core concepts of policies may be 
diffused – e.g. the guaranteed electricity tariff in the case of FITs (Jacobs, forthcoming) –, while their 
details – e.g. the actual level of the FIT – are elaborated in a domestic decision process. Therefore, our 
study can only capture the diffusion process of policies’ core features, while the actual adaptation of 
policies to the country context would have to be studied by case studies.  
Our focus on diffusion rather than invention enables the analysis of RE policies that have already proven 
to facilitate substantial deployment of RE in the North (e.g. feed-in tariffs). Further advantages are that 
diffusion processes cover a larger part of developing nations and GHG emissions, and that we can 
measure the impact of international financial assistance, which will rather promote diffusion of Northern 
policies and not Southern inventions. As downside, our analysis neglects that developing countries can 
also be relevant inventors of RE policies, see e.g. the Brazilian Alcohol Program (Moreira and 
Goldemberg, 1999), so our analysis will not capture the full set of RE policies but only the ones that 
diffuse after having been adopted in developed countries. 
Following Berry and Berry (2007), we assess whether it is mostly domestic factors that drive adoption – 
dependence on increasingly expensive fossil fuels, concerns about air pollution, environmental pressure 
groups, socio-economic and institutional factors –, or whether international policy diffusion mechanisms 
also play a role. We consider that both mechanisms of horizontal diffusion (between countries) and 
vertical diffusion (from the international to the national level) could be at play. These international 
diffusion channels may be linked to the diffusion mechanisms outlined in the literature: emulation, 
learning, coercion (including financial incentives) and competition (Dobbin et al., 2007; Shipan and 
Volden, 2008; Simmons et al., 2006). Policies could be emulated or learned from neighbouring countries 
or countries within the same region, with similar cultural, economic and historical background. Diffusion 
among economic peers, particularly countries within the same trade bloc, may also evidence competition. 
Furthermore, diffusion may also be enabled by learning and financial incentives connected to international 
public finance and the carbon market. Disentangling these different diffusion mechanisms is however 
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challenging, particularly in a large-N setting as the one we apply in this article, as several of them can take 
place simultaneously. Hence, while we follow the existing literature in discussing what mechanisms could 
be driving the observed diffusion of RE policies, we cannot test with our data which mechanism has 
actually taken place. 
These potential effects are tested using a panel dataset of RE support policies in 163 developing countries 
over the period from 1998 to 2009. We use a discrete time event history model with a logit link for 
estimating the probability of policy adoption of four selected policy types (RE targets, FITs, other 
financial incentives and policy frameworks), including time fixed effects to model the baseline hazard of 
adopting a policy.  
We start the paper by giving an overview of RE policies in developing countries in Section 2. In Section 3 
we provide a theoretical framework for RE policy adoption, adapted to developing and emerging 
countries, and derive hypotheses. After lining out the empirical strategy and operationalization in Sections 
4 and 5, we present and discuss the results (Section 6), draw conclusions and propose directions for 
further research (Section 7). 
 
2. RE support policies in developing countries: A brief overview 
Different types of domestic policies can help to overcome the various barriers that prevent the diffusion 
of RE technologies. Research and development and other technology-push policies are used for fostering 
innovations and long-term cost reductions in RE. Broader electricity-sector restructuring policies, 
including the liberalization of the sector, the regulation of access to transmission and distribution grids 
and the admittance of independent power producers, may also affect RE deployment, depending on their 
design (Kozloff, 1998; Martinot, 2002). 
The focus of this article is on policies directly promoting market growth of grid-based power generation 
by RE technologies. We have compiled a dataset of RE policies using data from different sources covering 
the years 1998 to 2009 organizations (e.g. EBRD, 2011; IEA, 2011a; REEEP, 2011; REN21, 2011). From 
the 163 analysed developing and emerging countries, of which 21 are European economies in transition 
(see Table S1 in the Supplementary Appendix for a full list of countries included in the analysis), 112 have 
some sort of policy or strategy to incentivize renewable power generation. The most common policies are 
targets, framework policies, the provision of incentives through tax reductions or subsidies, and FITs (see 
Table 1). 
 
(Table 1 about here) 
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In our analysis, we will focus on the four policy types that have diffused most: RE targets, framework 
policies, FITs and financial incentives (grants, concessional loans and tax reductions). As Matisoff and 
Edwards (forthcoming), we consider that different mechanisms may drive the adoption and the diffusion 
of different types of policies, thus the comparison across these four policies. Two of these policy types 
provide financial support (FITs and financial incentives), while the other two (targets and framework 
policies) are general strategies or guidelines. By analysing different policy types, we take into account new 
insights that policy innovation is not just dependent on the characteristics of the adopting actors but also 
on the characteristics of the policy itself (see Jordan and Huitema, forthcoming). 
Case studies have shown that domestic factors (e.g. the possibility of developing a new industry, 
generating employment and providing affordable energy) are a very important driver of RE policies in 
developing countries (Mitchell et al., 2011, p. 879). However, the wide array of policies and the 
considerable variation in patterns of adoption shown in Table 1 are an indication that not only domestic 
interests may drive policy adoption, but also external factors such as emulation and learning from peers, 
incentives provided by international climate policy initiatives or other policy diffusion mechanisms. Thus, 
in this study we aim at analysing more systematically when, where and why new policies to support RE 
emerge in developing countries.  
 
3. Policy adoption, innovation and diffusion: Theoretical background 
As has been shown in Table 1, in recent years more and more developing countries have adopted one or 
various policies to support the development of RE. In agreeing with the mainstream literature in the field, 
in this paper we consider that a policy innovation takes place whenever a country adopts a new policy for 
the first time, even if such a policy already exists in other countries (Walker, 1969, p. 881). This allows us 
to consider both internal (domestic) determinants of policy adoption and external (international) diffusion 
mechanisms.  
By both considering internal and external determinants, we follow the suggestion by Berry and Berry 
(2007) that a fully developed policy diffusion model cannot rely on internal or external covariates only; an 
approach also suggested by Tews (2005) for studying environmental policy diffusion. While we are aware 
that internal and external determinants may overlap (e.g. international public finance may only flow if 
domestic governments ask for support), we are separating them here conceptually as far as possible.  
Several theories seek to explain which factors affect the adoption of public policies. Environmental studies 
discuss environmental and resource pressures (Lester et al., 1983; Ringquist, 1994); developmentalists 
argue that socio-economic factors determine the scope of policy outputs and outcomes that are possible; 
institutionalist approaches posit that the political institutions and organizations in the country structure 
such policy decisions; public choice theory emphasizes the role of preferences and interests of different 
actors; sociological perspectives and policy diffusion theories underscore the role of formal and informal 
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relationships and networks within and outside the political system (John, 1998), including the processes of 
emulation, learning, coercion and competition described in Section 1. In the following, we draw from 
these theories for outlining our hypotheses regarding domestic and external determinants of policy 
adoption.  
 
3.1 Domestic determinants of RE policy adoption in developing countries 
Environmental factors 
Environmental and resource pressures are traditionally considered to be the trigger of policy-making in 
the environmental field: as populations grow, industrialization advances, and consumption increases, more 
pressures on the environment and natural resources are generated. The severity of these problems is 
expected to influence environmental policy-making (Huang et al., 2007; Ringquist, 1994; Sapat, 2004; 
Vachon and Menz, 2006). In the energy field, increased energy demand and volatile or rising fossil fuel 
prices may make governments more willing to promote RE due to energy security concerns, especially if 
they rely on fuel or electricity imports (Bird et al., 2005; Marques et al., 2010). Furthermore, concerns 
about energy-related environmental impacts such as local air pollution may motivate governments to 
support low-emission technologies such as RE. We focus on air pollution because it is often mentioned in 
the literature about environmental impacts of energy production in developing countries (Chan and Yao, 
2008; Mohamed and Lee, 2006; Winkler, 2005), and due to evidence that air pollution has actually led to 
protests and demands by the public in developing countries, which has put pressure on governments to 
address the problem (Economy, 2007; van Rooij, 2010). We acknowledge, however, that there may be 
other equally important environmental impacts of electricity production that we are not considering in the 
analysis. We hence expect that energy - r e la t ed  env ironmenta l  prob l ems (domes t i c  energy  inse cur i t y  and 
a ir  po l lu t ion)  may pos i t i v e l y  in f luence  the  adopt ion  o f  po l i c i e s  that  suppor t  RE dep loyment .  
Another environmental factor is the natural endowment with RE resources, such as solar irradiation, 
waterfalls or strong winds, which need to be present in sufficient quantity and quality to make RE 
investments competitive (Bird et al., 2005). We expect that governments  are  more  l ike ly  to  suppor t  RE 
te chno log i e s  i f  the i r  countr i e s  have  su f f i c i en t  natura l  r e sourc e s  to  make them work in  the  f i r s t  p la c e . 
 
Socio-economic factors  
Wealth has frequently been regarded as leading to stronger environmental policies, as policy adoption and 
implementation cost money (Ringquist, 1994; Vachon and Menz, 2006). This should be especially true in a 
highly technical and investment-intensive field such as renewable power generation. Furthermore, higher 
levels of income are usually accompanied with stronger environmental preferences of the population 
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(Elliott et al., 1997; Vachon and Menz, 2006). However, while empirical studies have sometimes found 
significant positive effects of wealth on environmental regulation (Fredriksson et al., 2005; Ringquist, 
1994; Sapat, 2004; Vachon and Menz, 2006; Zarnikau, 2003), some have also found insignificant effects 
(Arkesteijn and Oerlemans, 2005; Lester et al., 1983; Ringquist, 1994), or even marginally significant 
negative effects (Ek, 2005). In addition, as explained above, there is little empirical evidence about policy 
adoption in developing countries in particular, but we expect that the role of income should be even 
stronger there due to its relative scarcity and the resulting stronger competition for financial resources 
with other policy goals. An early study by Dasgupta et al. (2001) found strong support for the hypothesis 
that developing countries with higher income per capita tend to have better environmental policies and 
performance. Hence, we expect a clear positive relationship especially in the case of policies that provide 
subsidies for RE, because they will require a government with sufficient resources to finance them, and 
because higher income may both lead to stronger environmental preferences and higher electricity 
demand. Thus, we expect that higher  l ev e l s  o f  in come (as  a  proxy for  wea l th)  are  asso c ia t ed  wi th  a  
gr ea t er  adopt ion o f  po l i c i e s  that  f inanc ia l l y  suppor t  RE dep loyment . 
Similarly, a higher level of education makes the population more aware of environmental issues and the 
potential damages arising from them (Elliott et al., 1997), and leads to a more favourable assessment of 
the costs and benefits of environmental protection and related policy options. This results in increased 
support for environmental policies (Vachon and Menz, 2006; Zarnikau, 2003). Furthermore, a high level 
of education among the population may indicate a better capability by the administration to design new 
policies. Consequently, we expect that a higher  l ev e l  o f  educa t ion  i s  pos i t i v e l y  corr e la t ed  wi th  the  
adopt ion o f  po l i c i e s  to  promote  RE .  
 
Institutional factors  
Institutional theories posit that the characteristics of the political system influence policy adoption. There 
is an extensive literature on the role of democracy for environmental protection. Congleton (1992) 
theorizes that authoritarian regimes will adopt less stringent environmental standards than democratic 
ones, as democratic regimes follow the preferences of the median voter, who benefits more from the 
public provision of environmental quality than the authoritarian ruler, see also Fredriksson (1997) and 
Deacon (2000). While some literature has questioned this democracy-environment link (e.g. Midlarsky, 
1998), newer studies such as those by Fredriksson and Gaston (2000), Neumayer (2002), and Li and 
Reuveny (2006), show that democracies tend to show stronger environmental commitment than non-
democracies. We hence hypothesize that the  more  democra t i c  the  government ,  the  more  l ike ly  i t  i s  to  
adopt  po l i c i e s  that  suppor t  RE dep loyment . 
The institutional literature has also analyzed the effect of fractionalized political systems and of the 
number of veto players on policy adoption (Tsebelis, 1995, 1999), arguing that the more decision-making 
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instances are involved in agreeing a new policy, the less able is a government to adopt the policy. These 
theories have also been applied to the study of environmental policy adoption, for example by Knill et al. 
(2010) and Ashworth et al. (2006). In accordance, we posit that the  more  v e to  p layer s  wi th in  the  
po l i t i ca l  pro c e s s ,  the  l e s s  l ike ly  the  government  i s  to  adopt  po l i c i e s  that  suppor t  RE . One potential 
limitation in our analysis is that we are not able to account for the possibility that different types of 
policies – new laws, regulations or statutes, for example – may be subject to different sets of veto players. 
This may make it more difficult to find a clear effect of veto players on RE policy adoption.   
 
Interest groups and preferences 
The strength of environmental groups has been positively linked with more or stronger environmental 
policy, including policies that support the deployment of RE energy (Fredriksson et al., 2005; Vachon and 
Menz, 2006). Thus, we expect that countr i e s  w i th  h igh  pres ence  o f  env i ronmenta l  (and c iv i l  so c i e t y )  
g roups  are  more  l ike ly  to  adopt  RE suppor t  po l i c i e s .  
Ecological preferences of decision-makers and the public have been shown to be positively correlated 
with environmental policy-making (Knill et al., 2010; List and Sturm, 2006; Vachon and Menz, 2006). The 
rationale behind this is that a government of a population that generally cares about the environment can 
be expected to promote environmental policies. We hence expect that in  countr i e s  w i th  s t ronger  
pre f e r ence s  fo r  h igh  env ironmenta l  qua l i t y ,  the  government  i s  more  l ike ly  to  adopt  RE suppor t  
po l i c i e s . 
 
3.2 External determinants of policy adoption in developing countries  
The policy diffusion literature draws from theories of organizational decision-making to assert that policy-
makers look for ways to simplify their decision-making processes because capacity constraints prevent 
them from consulting all possible sources of information to find the best policy alternative. As a result, 
they look for solutions in other states or countries, where other policy-makers have solved similar 
problems successfully (Walker, 1969). Such learning – change in beliefs due to new evidence – or emulation 
– imitation due to socially constructed policy norms (Simmons et al., 2006) – is more likely to take place in 
case of neighbouring countries, or countries within the same region (MacGarvie, 2005), because such 
peers are more likely to meet in common fora and exchange information with each other (Berry and 
Berry, 2007). In addition, countries with cultural, historic or economic commonalities are also more likely 
to learn from each other (Simmons and Elkins, 2004) or even to compete for markets, e.g. for RE 
technology. Adoption of policies from culturally or historically similar countries can be understood as 
learning or emulation of peers “with psychological proximity”, an idea based on constructivist theories, while 
adoption of policies from countries with similar economic structures may be a sign of competition (Simmons 
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et al., 2006). Hence, we expect that the adopt ion o f  a  spe c i f i c  RE suppor t  po l i c y  i s  more  l ike ly  in  a  
country  i f  ne ighbours  or  countr i e s  w i th  a  common language ,  the  same co lon ia l  h i s tory ,  o r  w i th in  the  
same e conomic  and r eg iona l  b lo c ,  have  a l r eady  adopted  i t .  
Apart from the three horizontal diffusion mechanisms of competition, learning and emulation there is also a 
vertical diffusion mechanism: coercion by more powerful actors (Dobbin et al., 2007; Shipan and Volden, 
2008; Simmons et al., 2006). Different types of coercion are physical force, the monopolization of 
information or expertise and the manipulation of economic costs and benefits (Dobbin et al., 2007). The 
last type, manipulation of economic costs and benefits, does not need to be coercive, so we may add 
financial incentives as additional diffusion mechanism. Both coercion and incentive mechanisms of diffusion 
have been found in research on state-level policy adoption in the US (Daley and Garand, 2005). At the 
international level, such top-down diffusion originating from a central government is missing but 
hegemonic countries (e.g. the US) may have coercive power (Dobbin et al., 2007). In the context of 
developing countries, the influence of former colonizers may be particularly relevant, as strong economic 
and political ties have remained after independence (Albaugh, 2009; Neumayer, 2003; Neumayer and 
Perkins, 2005). Therefore, we stipulate that the adopt ion o f  RE po l i c i e s  i s  more  l ike ly  the  more  fo rmer  
co lon izer s  have  a l r eady  adopted  them.  
Vertical coercion or incentives may not only emerge from powerful countries but also from international 
organizations. Studies have found that international agreements (Tews et al., 2003) and international 
organizations (Edwards, 1997) may influence the adoption of national policies. As the international 
climate regime does not provide direct obligations for developing countries, and emission targets of 
transition countries under the Kyoto Protocol are not strict enough to require government actions, we do 
not expect a direct signal from the signature of the UN Framework Convention or Kyoto Protocol. 
However, developing countries may have reacted to more specific components of international climate 
policy that are targeted towards them. We hypothesize that developing country governments may have 
reacted to the financial opportunity provided by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), see von 
Stein (2008), and to RE-related capacity building under development and environmental finance initiatives 
(Heggelund et al., 2005). While reacting to the CDM would imply a form of incentive-based policy 
diffusion mechanism such as the one observed by Welch and Thompson (1980) or Daley and Garand 
(2005), the effects of capacity building would rather resemble learning. We thus postulate that deve lop ing  
countr i e s  w i th  in t e r e s t  in  par t i c ipa t ing  in  the  CDM, or  wi th  RE-re la t ed  pro j e c t s  under  
in t e rnat iona l  env i ronmenta l  or  deve lopment  funding  are  more  l ike ly  to  adopt  po l i c i e s  that  suppor t  
RE. In the case of European economies in transition, the European Union (EU) may both enable 
learning or use coercive power, e.g. by imposing RE targets on all member states (REN21, 2007). 
Therefore, we assume that the  a c c e s s ion  to  the  EU has a  pos i t i v e  in f luence  on the  adopt ion o f  RE 
po l i c i e s .  
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4. Empirical strategy and method 
In the most recent literature, the internal and external determinants of policy innovation are usually 
estimated by event history analysis, which can be used to model the probability that an event (in our case 
policy adoption) will take place given a set of covariates, see also Biesenbender and Tosun (2014). In the 
type of event history analysis applied here, we use area-period data (in our case country-year) and set the 
dependent variable (policy adoption) to 0 in all periods before adoption, to 1 in the period in which the 
policy is adopted, while excluding all countries from the dataset after the policy is adopted, as we are not 
interested in the presence but in the adoption of policies (Berry and Berry, 2007). We estimate the 
probability of policy adoption with a logit model, one of the standard models used for estimating discrete-
time event history models, using maximum likelihood techniques. Discrete-time models are suitable for 
this application, as our data on policy adoption is summarized in discrete time periods (years). We include 
time dummies to allow the data to determine the baseline hazard function in a non-parametric way rather 
than pre-determining it as would be the case when using a linear or any other function (Tekle and 
Vermunt, 2010). 
 
 
 
5. Data and operationalization 
5.1 Dependent variables 
As dependent variables we use dummies indicating the adoption year of each of the four RE support 
policies analysed. The timespan considered starts in 1998, as data on earlier adoption is not reliable, and 
ends in 2009, and covers 162 emerging and developing countries (see Supplementary Material, Table S1 
for a list of the countries included in the analysis). The variables were coded, as usual in event history 
analysis, with the value of one in the adoption year, zero before adoption, and missing after adoption, and 
were collected from different databases (EBRD, 2011; IEA, 2011a; REEEP, 2011; REN21, 2011). If both 
the year of legislative decision and of entry into force were reported (e.g. IEA, 2011a), we used the year of 
entry into force to allow for comparability because the most complete information source (REN21, 2011) 
just reported whether a policy is in place or not. If two sources reported different adoption years, we used 
the data from the sources with more contextual information on the adoption process (IEA, 2011a; 
REEEP, 2011). We only included policies adopted at the national level to make units comparable. To 
account for the fact that subnational RE policies may also play a relevant role in the 23% of countries in 
the dataset that have a federal system, we run a sensitivity analysis with a dummy for whether a country 
has a unitary (and not a federal) system as control variable, using data from Norris (2009), as contained in 
QOG (2012). 
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5.2 Domestic determinants of policy adoption 
Environmental factors 
Domest i c  energy  s e cur i ty :  we proxy domestic energy security with a variable reflecting the generic energy 
independence (% of domestic energy that is produced in-country). All data is sourced from EIA (2010). 
As additional measure for energy security, we would preferably also control for the average oil price in the 
relevant year, using data for the Brent - Europe crude oil price from EIA (2011). However, as energy 
prices only vary over time but not between countries, we can only test the influence of oil prices if we 
exclude the time fixed effects. Therefore, we will use models with oil prices only in the sensitivity analysis 
(see Supplementary Material, Table S8). 
Air po l lu t ion :  among all major air pollutants (SOX, NOX, PM10, VOC, and NH3), SOX is the only one for 
which the power sector is the most important source: roughly 70% of SOX emissions in Europe (EEA, 
2012) and of SO2 emissions in the US (EPA, 2012) originate from electricity production. In South and 
East Asia, the share was similar in 2000 (EDGAR, 2012). We, therefore, measure electricity-related air 
pollution with metric tonnes of SO2 per square metre of populated land area, using cross-sectional data of 
the year 2000 from EDGAR as reported in the Quality of Government dataset (QOG, 2012). 
Natura l  r e sourc e s :  we proxy hydropower resources with the logarithm of average rainfall in the relevant 
period (DWD/WZN, 2010) times average elevation of the country (Gallup et al., 2001), wind and solar 
resources with % of time when the wind speed is above 6m/s and latitude tilt radiation in kWh/m2/day in 
the years 1983-2005 (NASA, 2011), geothermal resources with the number of volcanoes as indicator for 
geothermal activity (Smithsonian Institution, 2011) and biomass resources with the agricultural area in km2 
(FAO, 2012). The original hydro, solar and wind data is pixel-based with a precision of 1 degree 
(geographical coordinates). We allocated this data to countries by assigning each pixel to a specific country 
(using Google maps coordinates) and averaging the hydro, solar and wind data in the pixels allocated to 
the respective country. 
 
Socio-economic factors  
Leve l  o f  in come:  the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is the usual way to measure the relative 
level of income. We use power purchasing parity figures for GDP to reflect the in-country value of 
income, obtaining data from the World Bank (2011). The GDP level was standardized to 2007 US dollars 
using deflators from the OECD (2010) and the logarithm was taken to improve the distribution of the 
variable. 
Leve l  o f  educa t ion and human resourc e s :  the percentage of gross secondary school enrolment was taken 
as proxy for the level of education (World Bank, 2011), as data on tertiary education is only available for a 
 
12 
limited amount of countries and years. For few country-year points, data was missing and we used linear 
interpolation to fill the gaps.  
Popula t ion :  to control for overall size of a country, we included the logarithm of the population as 
further determinant, using data from the World Bank (2011).  
 
Institutional factors  
Democracy :  all available indices for democracy over time have substantial drawbacks in conceptualization, 
measurement, and aggregation (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002), and only two (Polity and Freedom House 
Index) cover more than 150 countries and the time period 1995-2010. Of these two indicators with wide 
coverage, the Polity IV variable (Marshall et al., 2010) has better intercoder reliability, clearer and detailed 
coding rules (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002) and is, therefore, taken as our indicator for democracy. We do, 
however, try other indicators of democracy, such as Freedom House and the Bertelsmann Index 
contained in QOG (2012). Polity IV classifies countries from -10 (institutionalized autocracy) to 10 
(institutionalized democracy).  
Veto p layer s :  the number of veto players is taken from the Database of Political Institutions 2009 
(updated March 2010), as contained in the Quality of Government database (QOG, 2012). The variable 
was first coded by Keefer and Stasavage (2003), is at minimum one, and further increases the more veto 
players are involved in legislative decision-making.  
 
Interest groups and preferences 
Civ i l  so c i e ty  and env i ronmenta l  g roups :  The strength of civil society is measured with the number of 
development civil society organizations in the year 2000 (Grimes, 2008). Environmental pressure groups 
are measured with the presence of Greenpeace members in a country (data from von Stein, 2008) and the 
number of environmental Non-Governmental Organizations as listed in Europa Publications (2000) and 
Hartley et al. (2009); data in between the years reported in these publications was linearly interpolated. For 
all variables except the Greenpeace dummy we used the natural logarithm.  
Environmenta l  pre f e r ence s :  As we do not have a direct measure of ecological preferences for all 
countries included in our sample, we use presence of a Green Party (Global Greens, 2012) as proxy for 
environmental voting behaviour, and the terrestrial protected areas in % of total land area in the year 2008 
(World Bank, 2011) and air pollution, measured by the level of sulphur dioxide emissions (see above), as 
proxies for environmental preferences.  
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5.3 International determinants (horizontal and vertical) 
In f luence  f rom hor izonta l  d i f fus ion  mechanisms ( l earn ing ,  emula t ion  and compet i t ion) :  To proxy 
diffusion mechanisms originating from learning from, emulating, and competing with geographical, 
cultural and economic peers, we generate four variables (neighbours, common colony, common language and 
tradebloc) that entail the percentage of similar countries that had already adopted the relevant policy in the 
previous time period. To construct the neighbour, common colony, and language variables, we use dyadic 
data from CEPII (2011) on land borders, common colonizers and on countries with a common language 
spoken by at least 9% of the population. For the regional trade blocs, we use memberships in regional and 
trade organizations as contained in the 2.3 version of the COW-2 International Organizations Dataset, 
originally coded by Pevehouse et al. (2004). While primarily taking the 2005 membership data (as proxy 
for the period 2000-2010), we complemented UNASUR as regional organization and included all 
countries listed on UNASUR (2012) as members. Each country was assigned to only one organization, e.g. 
all North African states to the Arab League but not to the African Union. A list of the regional and trade 
organizations coded is provided in the Supplementary Material, Table S1.  
In f luence  f rom ver t i ca l  d i f fus ion  mechanisms ( coer c ion ,  in c en t iv e s  and l earn ing) :  For measuring the 
influence of the former colonizers, we construct a variable containing the percentage of former colonizers 
(in the past 200 years) that have adopted the policy in the previous time period, using dyadic data from 
CEPII (2011). If countries have not existed in colonial times, the colonizer of the respective geographical 
area was taken. For the Clean Development Mechanism we measured in how many of the past three years 
(t-1, t-2, t-3) the country has been host of at least one registered CDM project involving RE. We can rule 
out potential endogeneity, given that CDM projects are already planned at least 1-2 years before 
registration so it is very unlikely that their planning is influenced by policies adopted 2-5 years later. 
International environmental funding relevant for RE mainly stems from the Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF), the operational entity of the UNFCCC financial mechanism since the early 1990s. We use 
data from GEF (2011) on RE funding approved in the previous 3 periods, as coded by Stadelmann 
(2009). For international development funding, we use a dummy on whether official development 
assistance entailing support for RE was committed for the relevant country in the previous 3 periods. The 
data for development assistance promoting RE was taken from Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2011). For 
measuring the effect of EU membership, a dummy variable was created taking on the value of 1 if the 
country was member of the EU in 2005. In addition, we control for membership to the CEFTA (Central 
European Free Trade Agreement), since these countries’ policy choices may be influenced by their 
expectation to become EU member states soon. EU and CEFTA membership are coded for the year 2005 
to keep consistency with the coding of other regional and trade blocs. 
Table S2 in the Supplementary Material provides an overview of all variables, their summary statistics and 
their expected influence. A correlation table can be found in Table S3. Given that we control for many 
covariates, we only have full data for 106 of the 163 countries in our dataset; the other countries are 
excluded from the analysis (see Table S1 for the list of 106 countries included). This non-random sample 
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selection questions the validity of the results beyond the included countries. While included countries do 
not differ significantly from excluded countries in terms of RE policy adoption probability, they tend to 
be clearly larger, have more civil society groups, more neighbours and trade bloc peers that adopt RE 
policies and they receive more international financial support for RE deployment (see Supplementary 
Material Table S9).  
 
6. Results  
For each of the four types of policies in our dependent variables, we have estimated full models including 
all variables described above and parsimonious models only including variables that had a significant or 
almost significant impact in at least one of the full models. Likelihood ratio tests, the Akaike Information 
Criterion and the Bayesian Information Criterion suggest that the parsimonious models are preferable (see 
Supplementary Material, Tables S4a and S4b). Therefore, we will in the following discuss the results of the 
parsimonious models (Table 2), while referring to the full models only if needed. In all models and for all 
independent variables, we report the marginal effects, which makes it easier to understand the actual 
magnitude of the effect on RE policy adoption (% changes). We report the marginal effects at the average 
value of all variables in the model, in order to show the estimated effects for an average country in the 
dataset. As this represents the effects for a country that cannot really exist, as membership in the EU or 
CEFTA is either given or not, we have also calculated the marginal effects setting the EU and CEFTA 
dummy variables to zero but results are similar (see Table S5). 
In general both domestic and international determinants are important for policy adoption but we find 
slightly more evidence for the relevance of domestic compared to international drivers, as shown by the 
model evaluation criteria (AIC, BIC) estimated for regression models including either only international or 
only domestic determinants (see Table S6 in the Supplementary Material). These results are consistent 
with other recent studies of RE policy diffusion across US states, in which the states’ internal 
determinants are found to be more important than diffusion variables in explaining policy adoption (Lyon 
and Yin, 2010; Matisoff and Edwards, forthcoming; Matisoff, 2008). They challenge however earlier 
findings from the sociological literature on World Society Theory, which argue that external forces 
(international diffusion variables) provide a stronger explanation for policy adoption in the environmental 
domain than domestic ones (see e.g. Frank et al., 2000).   
 
6.1 Domestic determinants 
Environmental factors 
 
15 
We hypothesized that energy insecurity and bad air quality would have a positive effect on RE policy 
adoption. In terms of energy insecurity, our estimates show that the share of domestically-produced 
energy decreases the probability of FIT adoption and financial incentives, which is in line with our 
expectations. 
Our indicator for air quality (SO2) never displayed significant coefficients, which may be due to the fact 
that two opposing effects may be at play: while bad air quality may encourage governments to adopt 
policies that help to reduce air pollution, good air quality may be an indicator of an environmentally-
friendly government that is more inclined to support RE policy. Further research is thus needed to clarify 
whether air quality does have an impact on RE policy adoption.  
In terms of natural resources, our models estimate a significant positive relationship between wind 
resources and target adoption, solar resources and financial incentives, and biomass and hydro resources 
and tariff adoption (all in line with the expected effects), but they do not estimate similar effects for all the 
other combinations analysed. In addition, the models find a negative relationship between hydrological 
resources and the adoption of RE targets, which is against our theoretical expectations. This may be 
related to the fact that most countries with large hydro power resources already had a substantial share of 
RE historically, so they may feel less inclined to adopt new RE targets.  
 
Socio-economic factors 
GDP per capita has an estimated significant effect on the adoption of FITs and other financial incentives 
but not for other policies as expected. We also expected to find a positive effect of education on RE 
policy adoption, but the positive coefficient is not significant in any of our full models so we excluded it 
from the parsimonious ones. As our education variable is highly correlated with GDP per capita (see 
Supplementary Material, Table S3), such a weak effect is not surprising. In contrast, all models estimate 
that population as measure for the overall size of the country is positively related with policy adoption. 
 
Institutional factors 
Our indicator for democracy is a significant predictor for adoption of financial incentives, while the 
coefficient is also positive but not significant in the other models (the influence of democracy on 
frameworks becomes significant at the 10% level if we include the unitary state dummy). When replacing 
our indicator Polity IV with other democracy indicators - Freedom House and Bertelsmann Democracy 
Status -, the model obtains similar results and we can, therefore, be quite confident that, in the case of RE 
financial incentives, our findings support Congleton’s (1992) theory that democracies are more likely to 
adopt environmental protection policies. 
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Veto players have no significant impact according to model estimates, although the expected negative 
coefficient is just not significant at the 10% level in case of financial incentives. A negative impact on 
financial incentives seems generally most reasonable among the analysed policies as financial incentives 
involve more financial resources than targets and framework policies (and also require parliamentary 
approval in most cases), so opposition from major political players is more likely, while in the case of 
FITs, important veto players may be in favour (for the case of Germany, see Jacobs, forthcoming; 
Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). As discussed above, the quality of our data does not allow us to account for 
the type of policy instrument used (in terms of it being a fully-fledged law, or just a regulation to an 
existing law or an even lower-level instrument), which may limit the comparability of veto players’ effects 
across our cases, and thus reduce the statistical significance of our findings.   
In one of our sensitivity analyses (see Table S8), the model estimates, as expected, that unitary states are 
more likely to adopt targets, tariffs and incentives than federal ones, but this effect is not significant and 
does not affect other results other than rendering the EU dummy insignificant, which is due to the 
positive correlation of EU membership and unitary systems in the dataset. Federal states are estimated to 
be more likely to adopt policy frameworks, which may be related to the fact that in federal systems, 
national policy frameworks serve as basis for sub-national policies. 
Interest groups and preferences 
Almost all variables related to the potential role of interest groups (civil society organizations, 
environmental NGOs) and environmental preferences (natural protected areas, green party existence) 
appear not to have a significant relationship with RE policy adoption. One limitation of this finding is that 
our indicators for interest groups and environmental preferences are sub-optimal; membership in all 
environmental NGOs and environmental voting behaviour of parliaments would be preferable indicators 
but data is not available. Therefore, we cannot rule out that interest groups and governmental preferences 
are influential; we can just conclude that the indicators we used have no significant effect according to our 
models. As the coefficients were consistently not significant, these variables are not included in the 
parsimonious specifications in Table 2 (for coefficients, see the Supplementary Material, Table S8). 
 
6.2 International determinants 
When turning to the international diffusion mechanisms, our estimations did not find a significant impact 
of policy adoption by trade bloc partners, colonizing countries and countries with the same language on 
adoption of RE policies in the full models, and these variables are, therefore, excluded from the 
parsimonious models. Adoption by neighbours is related to an increase in the adoption of framework 
policies but the coefficient is not significant at the 10% level, unless we include the unitary state dummy. 
In contrast, adoption by countries that had belonged to the same colony has a significant impact on 
adoption of FITs, incentives and framework policies, which supports our expectations. Having the same 
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colonial past may imply a similar regulatory culture that promotes policy diffusion, in the same way as the 
Walker regions’ regulatory culture, see Matisoff and Edwards (forthcoming). All these results hold both 
when including all diffusion variables in the same regression model, and when including them individually 
(see Table S7 in the Supplementary Material). Membership to the EU is estimated to be influential for 
adoption of targets, tariffs and financial incentives. This underlines the institutional role of the EU as early 
mover in policies to promote RE and reduce greenhouse gases, and is in line with the policy convergence 
theories (Holzinger et al., 2008) and also with the findings of Biesenbender and Tosun (2014). We have, 
however, to be cautious about the EU effect, as the coefficient is not significant at the 90% level anymore 
if including the unitary state dummy. 
Funding from the Global Environment Facility is estimated to have a positive influence on adoption of 
framework policies, while the impact was not significant for other policies. However, we have to be 
cautious about concluding that GEF has been successful in its capacity building efforts, as the GEF 
coefficient is quite sensitive to the model specification (see the Supplementary Material, Table S4a/b). We 
do not find a significant relationship between official development funding (ODA) and policy adoption – 
only in the case of FITs the model estimates an effect that is almost significant at the 10% level.  
The registration of CDM projects was irrelevant for all policies in the standard model, although the 
influence on target adoption and framework policies was significant at the 10% level if other lags for the 
CDM were used (see Supplementary Material, Table S8) or the unitary state dummy was included. The 
potential influence on target setting and framework policies may relate to the positive signal of CDM 
project registration on the feasibility of more ambitious RE targets, while the clearly non-significant 
influence on financial incentives and tariffs may relate to the fear of developing countries that, after 
adoption of new incentive policies, their RE projects are not considered as “additional” to the business-as-
usual scenario any more, which would make them ineligible for CDM funding (Winkler, 2004). 
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
7. Conclusions 
This article is a first attempt to understand climate policy innovation in the South, a process that has been 
largely neglected by the policy innovation literature, but which is crucial for global climate change 
governance. Developing countries have a key role to play in the planned low-carbon transformation, but 
in the absence of internationally-binding regulations on their carbon emissions, achieving such a role 
requires domestic-level incentives and policies. Concretely, we shed light on the theoretically expected 
determinants of the adoption of RE support policies in developing countries, considering both domestic 
factors and international diffusion mechanisms and four different types of RE policies. 
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Among the domestic factors investigated, environmental factors and interest groups are only partly found 
to be relevant for RE policy adoption according to our models. Our models suggest that domestic energy 
production, as a proxy for energy security, decreases the probability of promoting RE through FITs and 
financial incentives, while the level of environmental quality does not have a significant influence. Our 
indicators of interest groups – Greenpeace memberships, number of environmental NGOs, and other 
civil society groups – are estimated to have no influence on RE policy adoption, but given that these 
indicators are quite imperfect, further research on the influence of interest groups and environmental 
preferences is needed. Furthermore, our models find some evidence that having hydrological potential 
decreases the probability of adopting RE targets, which often exclude traditional hydro power, while 
availability of other renewable resources can increase the probability of RE policy adoption. 
We have strong statistical evidence that socio-economic and institutional characteristics affect the 
probability of policy adoption. The level of income is estimated to have a positive influence on the 
adoption of costly policies, such as financial incentives and feed-in tariffs. Our models suggest that 
countries with a larger population have a higher probability of adopting policies that support the 
deployment of RE, while a more democratic system promotes at least the adoption of financial incentives.  
In terms of international policy diffusion, we have found little evidence for horizontal diffusion 
mechanisms. Our models estimate that only adoption by peers that had the same colonial history increases 
the likelihood of policy adoption, while adoption of a policy by neighbours, trade partners and countries 
with the same language has no influence. These results match with recent findings from the US (Matisoff 
and Edwards, forthcoming), where adoption by neighbour states had no impact on RE policy adoption, 
while states with similar regulatory histories (“Walker regions”) influence each other. Such diffusion 
among peers with similar colonial history may be related to established institutions or fora that enable 
exchange, such as the Commonwealth (Leichter, 1983; Stone, 2000), or similar administrative and political 
systems (Weber et al., 2009; Weiner, 1987) that may simplify emulation and learning.   
Vertical channels of policy diffusion are also estimated to be relevant. In particular, membership of the 
EU seems to increase the adoption of RE policies, although the effect is not significant when controlling 
for federalism of the system. Our models also find some evidence that funding from the GEF has positive 
effects on the adoption of framework policies but not of more specific support policies, which is in line 
with the primary role of the GEF as capacity building organization promoting learning, and its lack of 
funding for substantial incentives. Having RE projects supported by the CDM is estimated to increase the 
adoption of RE targets and policy frameworks according to some model specifications, while it does not 
affect the probability of adopting financial incentives and FITs. This is an important finding, given that 
the CDM has also been discussed as disincentive for RE policy adoption (He and Morse, 2010; Winkler, 
2004).  
The study has some limitations that show potential further areas of research. First, the distinction between 
domestic and international determinants is rather simplistic. In reality, domestic and international 
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determinants may interact, e.g. the share of domestic energy is also dependent on the price and availability 
of international energy sources and the impact of international climate funding will depend on national 
institutions. Therefore, more qualitative work on the interplay between domestic and international actors 
and institutions may provide further insights. Within the emerging economies, case studies could look at 
countries such as China or India, which face significant pressure from the international community to act 
domestically to tackle climate change, but which also have a strong domestic interest in diversifying their 
(currently very coal-intensive) energy matrix. In poorer developing countries, case study selection could 
rather be based on similarity of domestic institutions and strength of ties with industrialized countries (e.g. 
former colonizers). Such qualitative studies may also explore whether the effects of the EU and of 
international climate finance rather relate to learning and emulation or to coercion and incentives. Finally, 
they could also shed a clearer light on the different findings between the political science and the 
sociological literature about the relative importance of domestic and international determinants in 
fostering policy adoption.  
Second, Walker’s (1969) definition of first-time adoption of a policy within a country neglects the multi-
step policy process, so further research may analyse the processes of adapting policies to the national 
context and of tightening or relaxing policies after first-time adoption. This is critical, as there is evidence 
that changes in pricing policies or tax incentives can stop investments, as experienced in Tamil Nadu with 
wind power tariffs in 2001 and in Sri Lanka with small hydro power in 1999 (Jagadeesh, 2000; Martinot et 
al., 2002). A first quantitative study in this direction, albeit in a different policy area, is presented by 
Biesenbender and Tosun (2014). Furthermore, it may be fruitful to use event history models also for the 
study of other climate policies in developing countries, such as climate change adaptation strategies and 
generic policies pledged under recent climate agreements. 
Third, our separate analysis of different policies may hide the fact that policies are not adopted 
independently from each other  – the adoption of one policy may make the adoption of another policy 
less likely (in case of competing instruments) or more likely (in case of complementary instruments). We 
actually tested whether the presence of framework policies increases the likelihood of tariff and incentive 
adoption, but did not find any significant result. Multinomial models would have to be used to find out 
whether policies are competing with each other. 
For policymakers, the results suggest that plans to set up renewable energy policies in developing 
countries should consider that different factors may influence RE policy adoption in the North and in the 
South. In particular, our models estimate that beyond domestic-level determinants such as income levels 
and democracy, which have been already studied in the existing literature, and beyond the well-known 
Europeanization effect, RE policy adoption in the South also seems to be influenced by the countries’ 
colonial past and to a certain extent by financial support received through international institutions. Our 
evidence shows however that so far, international financial transfers – through the GEF and the carbon 
market – have only been supportive of the adoption of “soft” policies such as RE targets and policy 
frameworks that may arguably not be as effective in promoting the energy transformation as pricing 
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policies or other financial instruments. Policymakers hence could consider how to improve or 
complement the existing international support mechanisms so that more powerful domestic policies can 
also be supported.  
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Table 1: Adoption of RE policies in developing and emerging countries 
Type of policy Number of countries (excluding  
European economies in transition)a  
 
 1999 2004 2009 
General strategy    
  RE targets 3(1)  18(11) 56(43) 
  Framework policies (strategies, plans, generic laws)  19(14)  55(41) 96(78) 
Regulatory policies    
   Renewable portfolio standards / utility quotas 0 3(1)  9(6) 
   Feed-in tariff and energy production payments  4(2) 15(9) 40(26) 
   Improved access to the electricity grid  4(2) 17(11) 26(16) 
   Other regulatory measures 3(2) 8(6) 13(10) 
Financial incentives 7(4) 21(14) 42(30) 
Public financing    
   Public investment 2(2) 3(2) 17(13) 
   Competitive bidding / tenders 0 1(1) 8(6) 
   Research & development 5(4) 8(6) 13(10) 
Total Countries with RE policies/strategies 31(22) 72(54) 112(92) 
a: Source: Data on policy type and year of adoption from IEA (2011b), REEEP (2011) and REN21 (2011), see section 5.1 for 
details. Numbers in parentheses exclude European economies in transition, which are by some not considered to belong to 
developing and emerging countries. 
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Table 2: Logit estimations of the probability of policy adoption (parsimonious models)  
 Targets Feed-in-tariffs Financial incentives Framework policies 
 dy/dxa  SEb dy/dx  SE dy/dx  SE dy/dx  SE 
Domestic determinants 
Domestic energyc -0.001  (0.001) -0.004 **d (0.001) -0.002  (0.001) -0.003  (0.004) 
GDP per capita 0.001  (0.002) 0.008 ** (0.002) 0.009 ** (0.003) 0.010  (0.008) 
Populationc 0.007 *** (0.002) 0.005 ** (0.002) 0.007 *** (0.003) 0.017 *** (0.005) 
Hydro resources -0.004 ** (0.002) 0.005 ** (0.002) 0.002  (0.002) -0.006  (0.005) 
Wind resources 0.000 ** (0.000) -0.000  (0.000) 0.000  (0.000) 0.000  (0.000) 
Solar resources 0.001  (0.003) 0.000  (0.004) 0.006 * (0.003) -0.008  (0.011) 
Geothermal res. -0.000  (0.000) 0.000  (0.000) 0.000  (0.000) -0.000  (0.001) 
Biomass resources -1.768  (1.178) 0.566 * (0.321) -0.662  (1.029) -1.899  (2.158) 
Democracy 0.000  (0.000) 0.001  (0.001) 0.001 * (0.000) 0.002  (0.001) 
Veto players 0.001  (0.001) -0.001  (0.002) -0.002  (0.001) -0.001  (0.004) 
International determinants 
EU member 0.021 ** (0.010) 0.030 ** (0.013) 0.027 ** (0.012) -0.014  (0.032) 
CEFTA 0.013  (0.009) 0.016  (0.010) 0.018 * (0.010) 0.045  (0.030) 
Neighbours 0.010  (0.007) -0.012  (0.010) 0.008  (0.008) 0.034  (0.024) 
Common colony -0.004  (0.016) 0.066 ** (0.026) 0.080 ** (0.037) 0.068 * (0.040) 
CDM projects 0.005  (0.003) -0.002  (0.004) 0.002  (0.003) 0.023  (0.017) 
GEF funding 0.005  (0.004) 0.006  (0.005) 0.004  (0.004) 0.031 * (0.018) 
Development aid -0.004  (0.004) 0.006  (0.005) 0.004  (0.005) 0.003  (0.015) 
  Year dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
N 1122   938   941   864   
Years 12   10   10   12   
log likelihood -137.7   -109.6   -110.1   -185.7   
BIC 479.0   404.0   405.0   567.4   
a: dy/dx: Marginal effects at mean values of all other independent variables 
b: SE: standard error 
c: For these variables the 2009 values have been extrapolated 
d: Significance levels: * = p-value <0.1, ** = p-value <0.05, *** = p-value <0.01  
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Table S1: Coding of regional / trade blocs by country (used for tradebloc variable) 
Tradebloc Country 
ASEAN Brunei Darussalam  
ASEAN Cambodia* 
ASEAN Indonesia* 
ASEAN Lao PDR* 
ASEAN Malaysia* 
ASEAN Myanmar 
ASEAN Philippines* 
ASEAN Singapore 
ASEAN Sri Lanka* 
ASEAN Thailand* 
ASEAN Vietnam* 
AU Angola* 
AU Benin* 
AU Botswana* 
AU Burkina Faso* 
AU Burundi* 
AU Cameroon* 
AU Cape Verde 
AU Central African Rep.* 
AU Chad 
AU Congo* 
AU Côte d'Ivoire 
AU Dem. Rep.of Congo 
AU Equatorial Guinea* 
AU Eritrea 
AU Ethiopia* 
AU Gabon* 
AU Gambia 
AU Ghana* 
AU Guinea* 
AU Guinea-Bissau 
AU Kenya* 
AU Lesotho 
AU Liberia 
AU Madagascar* 
AU Malawi* 
AU Mali* 
AU Mauritius 
AU Mozambique* 
AU Namibia* 
AU Niger* 
AU Nigeria* 
AU Rwanda* 
AU Sao Tome & Principe 
AU Senegal* 
AU Seychelles 
AU Sierra Leone 
AU South Africa* 
AU Swaziland* 
AU Tanzania* 
AU Togo* 
AU Uganda* 
AU Zambia* 
AU Zimbabwe 
CARICOM Bahamas 
CARICOM Barbados 
CARICOM Belize 
CARICOM Dominica 
CARICOM Grenada 
CARICOM Guyana* 
CARICOM Haiti  
CARICOM Jamaica* 
CARICOM St. Kitts-Nevis 
CARICOM St. Lucia 
CARICOM St.Vincent & Gren. 
CARICOM Suriname 
CARICOM Trinidad and Tobago* 
CEFTA Albania* 
CEFTA Bosnia-Herzegovina 
CEFTA Bulgaria* 
CEFTA Croatia 
CEFTA Macedonia* 
CEFTA Romania* 
CIS Armenia* 
CIS Azerbaijan* 
CIS Belarus* 
CIS Georgia 
CIS Kazakhstan* 
CIS Kyrgyzstan 
CIS Moldova* 
CIS Russia* 
CIS Tajikistan* 
CIS Turkmenistan 
CIS Ukraine* 
CIS Uzbekistan* 
ChiKorMon China* 
ChiKorMon Korea, Republic of* 
ChiKorMon Mongolia* 
ChiKorMon Taiwan 
EU Cyprus  
EU Czech Republic* 
EU Estonia* 
EU Hungary* 
EU Latvia* 
EU Lithuania* 
EU Poland* 
EU Slovak Republic* 
EU Slovenia* 
LOAS Algeria 
LOAS Bahrain* 
LOAS Comoros* 
LOAS Djibouti 
LOAS Egypt* 
LOAS Iraq* 
LOAS Jordan* 
LOAS Kuwait* 
LOAS Lebanon 
LOAS Libya* 
LOAS Mauritania* 
LOAS Morocco* 
LOAS Oman* 
LOAS Qatar 
LOAS Saudi Arabia* 
LOAS Somalia 
LOAS Sudan* 
LOAS Syria* 
LOAS Tunisia* 
LOAS United Arab Emirates* 
LOAS Yemen* 
NAFTA Mexico* 
SAARC Bangladesh* 
SAARC Bhutan* 
SAARC India* 
SAARC Maldives 
SAARC Nepal* 
SAARC Pakistan* 
SICA Costa Rica* 
SICA El Salvador* 
SICA Guatemala* 
SICA Honduras 
SICA Nicaragua* 
SICA Panama* 
SPC Cook Islands 
SPC Fiji* 
SPC Kiribati 
SPC Marshall Islands 
SPC Micronesia, Fed. Stat. 
SPC Nauru 
SPC Niue 
SPC Palau 
SPC Papua 
SPC Samoa 
SPC Solomon Islands 
SPC Timor-Leste 
SPC Tonga 
SPC Tuvalu 
SPC Vanuatu 
UNASUR Argentina* 
UNASUR Bolivia* 
UNASUR Brazil* 
UNASUR Chile* 
UNASUR Colombia* 
UNASUR Ecuador* 
UNASUR Paraguay* 
UNASUR Peru* 
UNASUR Uruguay* 
UNASUR Venezuela* 
- Cuba 
- Dominican Republic* 
- Iran* 
- Israel* 
- Turkey* 
 
* 106 countries included in the 
empirical analysis (in case of other 
countries, data was not available for 
all variables)
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Table S2: Description and summary statistics of all variables 
Variable Description  Sign Source N Mean SD Min Max 
Target adoption Adoption of renewable energy targets in 
specific year (dummy) 
 
Own coding using data 
from EBRD, 2011; IEA, 
2011a; REEEP, 2011; 
REN21, 2011;  
1122 0.04 0.20 0.0 1.0 
Tariff adoption Adoption of feed-in tariffs in specific year 
(dummy) 
 1020 0.03 0.16 0.0 1.0 
Incentive 
adoption 
Adoption of financial incentive for RE in 
specific year (dummy) 
 1029 0.03 0.16 0.0 1.0 
Framework 
adoption 
Adoption of framework policy for RE in 
specific year (dummy) 
 835 0.07 0.26 0.0 1.0 
Domestic energy % of energy consumption produced 
domestically 
- EIA (2010) 1122 -0.65 1.91 -8.5 5.0 
GDP per capita Natural logarithm of GDP per capita in 
2007 USD, PPP 
+ World Bank (2011) 1122 8.28 1.16 5.6 11.3 
Population Natural logarithm of population + World Bank (2011) 1122 16.11 1.49 13.1 21.0 
Education % gross secondary school enrolment + World Bank (2011).  1122 0.61 0.29 0.1 1.2 
Hydro resources Natural logarithm of average annual rainfall 
* average elevation  
+/- DWD/WZN (2010), 
Gallup et al. (2001) 
1122 5.83 1.48 1.0 8.3 
Wind resources % of time wind speed is above 6 m/s, 
average over country area 
+ NASA(2011) 1122 18.53 13.51 0.1 52.9 
Solar resources Latitude tilt radiation in kWh/m2/ day, 
average over country area 
+ NASA(2011) 1122 4.96 0.84 2.7 6.4 
Geothermal reso Number of volcanoes in the country + Smithsonian Institution 
(2011) 
1122 3.76 10.97 0.1 73.0 
Biomass res. Agricultural area in km2 per capita + FAO (2012)  1122 0.00 0.01 0.0 0.1 
Democracy Polity IV index (10=full democracy, -10 = 
full autocracy) 
+ Marshall et al. (2010) 1122 2.17 6.47 -10.0 10.0 
Unitary state Unitary, and not federal state + QOG (2012) 1122 0.77 0.42 0.0 0.1 
Pollution (SO2) SO2 emissions per square meters +/- EDGAR (2012) 1122 3.97 13.82 0.0 131.0 
Civil society 
organizat. 
Natural logarithm of development civil 
society organizations in 2000 
+ Grimes (2008)  1122 4.29 1.43 -2.3 6.6 
Veto players # of  veto players in the country - QOG (2012) 1122 2.60 1.56 1.0 18.0 
EU member EU membership (dummy) + Own coding 1122 0.05 0.21 0.0 1.0 
CEFTA Membership in CEFTA (dummy) + Own coding 1122 0.04 0.20 0.0 1.0 
Language % countries with same language having 
adopted the policy one year ago 
+ Own coding using CEPII 
(2011)  
1122 0.11 0.15 0.0 1.0 
Neighbours % neighbour countries having adopted the 
policy one year ago 
+ Own coding using CEPII 
(2011)  
1122 0.12 0.22 0.0 1.0 
Tradebloc % of countries within the same bloc having 
adopted the policy one year ago 
+ Own coding using 
Pevehouse et al. (2004) 
1122 0.08 0.12 0.0 0.9 
Common colony % of countries with same colonizer having 
adopted the policy a year ago 
+ Own coding using CEPII 
(2011)  
1122 0.03 0.06 0.0 0.3 
Colonizer Dummy whether former colonizer has 
adopted policy 
 Own coding using CEPII 
(2011) 
1122 0.63 0.47 0.0 1.0 
CDM projects CDM projects for RE registered in 3 
previous years  
+ URC (2012) 1122 0.09 0.38 0.0 3.0 
GEF funding GEF grants for RE approved in 3 previous 
years (dummy) 
+ Stadelmann (2009) 1122 0.11 0.31 0.0 1.0 
Development aid ODA grants for RE committed in 3 
previous years (dummy) 
+ Michaelowa and 
Michaelowa (2011) 
1122 0.56 0.50 0.0 1.0 
Green Party Existence of Green Party  (dummy) + Global Greens (2012) 1122 0.53 0.50 0.0 1.0 
Protected area Terrestrial protected areas in % of total land 
area in the year 2008 (100=100%) 
+ World Bank (2011) 984 17.38 17.08 0.0 110.4 
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Table S3: Correlation table (pair-wise Spearman correlation coefficients) 
Target adoption 1.00             
                 
    
Tariff adoption 0.12 1.00           
                 
    
Incentive adopt. 0.01 0.21 1.00         
                 
    
Framework adopt. 0.35 0.08 0.17 1.00       
                 
    
Domestic energy -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 1.00     
                 
    
GDP per capita 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.32 1.00   
                 
    
Population 0.13 0.03 0.11 0.11 0.08 -0.25 1.00 
                 
    
Education 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.77 -0.12 1.00             
          
    
Hydro resources -0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 -0.04 -0.41 0.19 -0.32 1.00           
          
    
Wind resources 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.14 -0.14 0.28 -0.26 1.00         
          
    
Solar resources -0.08 -0.16 -0.09 -0.10 -0.01 -0.29 0.02 -0.50 -0.12 0.13 1.00       
          
    
Geothermal res. 0.02 0.04 0.14 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.33 0.12 0.19 -0.02 -0.17 1.00     
          
    
Biomass resources -0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.06 -0.01 -0.16 0.04 -0.08 0.19 0.03 -0.07 1.00   
          
    
Democracy 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.08 -0.28 0.02 0.06 0.19 0.33 -0.10 -0.24 0.17 0.07 1.00 
          
    
Pollution (SO2) 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.34 -0.15 0.28 -0.39 0.09 0.01 -0.02 -0.08 -0.09 1.00             
   
    
Civil society org. 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.08 -0.28 -0.50 0.5 -0.33 0.50 -0.26 0.00 0.19 -0.06 0.42 -0.26 1.00           
   
    
Veto players 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.08 -0.11 0.02 0.22 0.12 0.18 -0.09 -0.18 0.12 -0.05 0.60 -0.06 0.33 1.00         
   
    
EU member 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.04 -0.03 0.24 -0.15 0.26 -0.14 -0.06 -0.51 -0.07 -0.06 0.24 0.03 -0.12 0.22 1.00       
   
    
CEFTA 0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.06 0.00 0.13 -0.11 0.18 0.04 -0.15 -0.28 -0.07 -0.06 0.18 0.01 -0.02 0.07 -0.05 1.00     
   
    
Language 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.07 -0.05 -0.04 0.15 -0.10 0.11 -0.10 0.14 -0.06 -0.07 0.13 -0.02 0.12 0.04 -0.03 -0.07 1.00   
   
    
Neighbours 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.11 -0.08 0.11 -0.01 0.19 0.04 -0.03 -0.31 -0.02 0.03 0.15 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.19 0.27 0.16 1.00 
   
    
Tradebloc 0.12 0.16 0.13 0.11 -0.02 0.07 0.03 0.19 -0.04 0.00 -0.32 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.09 -0.07 0.30 0.03 0.19 0.54 1.00           
Common colony 0.03 0.1 0.00 0.05 -0.11 -0.08 -0.14 0.04 -0.14 0.08 -0.06 -0.17 -0.03 -0.19 -0.02 -0.08 -0.13 0.07 -0.13 0.19 0.23 0.54 1.00         
CDM projects 0.13 -0.01 0.12 0.13 -0.05 0.08 0.04 0.12 0.14 0.00 -0.03 0.11 -0.03 0.13 -0.01 0.13 0.05 -0.05 -0.05 0.17 0.11 0.17 0.03 1.00     
GEF funding 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.15 -0.04 0.00 0.16 0.11 0.10 -0.02 -0.09 0.12 -0.07 0.04 -0.06 0.13 0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.24 1.00    
Development aid 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.09 -0.05 -0.20 0.31 -0.04 0.33 -0.10 -0.11 0.15 0.01 0.23 -0.17 0.42 0.13 -0.01 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.13 -0.01 0.15 0.17 1.00   
Green Party 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.03 -0.17 0.24  -0.03 0.15 -0.17 -0.29 0.10 0.04 0.31 -0.15 0.37 0.24 0.21 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.05 -0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.19  1.00  
Protected areas -0.02 0.04 -0.00 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.21 -0.20 -0.00 0.17 0.01 0.25  -0.00 0.17 0.23 -0.03 -0.05 0.02 -0.07  -0.12 -0.16 0.12 0.02 0.12  0.11 1.00 
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Table S4a: Full models compared to parsimonious models (targets and feed-in tariffs)  
 RE Targets  
(parsimonious model) 
RE Targets  
(full model) 
Feed-in-tariffs 
(parsimonious model) 
Feed-in-tariffs  
(full model) 
 dy/dxa SEb dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE 
Domestic determinants 
Domestic energyc -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.004 **d (0.001) -0.003 ** (0.001) 
GDP per capita 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.003) 0.008 ** (0.002) 0.006 * (0.003) 
Population 0.007 *** (0.002) 0.006 ** (0.002) 0.005 ** (0.002) 0.004 ** (0.002) 
Education    0.010 (0.011)    0.002 (0.012) 
Hydro resources -0.004 ** (0.002) -0.003 ** (0.002) 0.005 ** (0.002) 0.005 ** (0.000) 
Wind resources 0.000 ** (0.000) 0.000 * (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.003) 
Solar resources 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.004) -0.000 (0.000) 
Geothermal res. -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Biomass resources -1.768 (1.178) -1.923 * (1.064) 0.566 * (0.321) 0.566 ** (0.280) 
Democracy 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
Pollution (SO2)    -0.000 (0.000)    0.000 (0.000) 
Civil society org.    0.001 (0.002)    -0.000 (0.002) 
Veto players 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) -0.000 (0.001) 
International determinants 
EU member 0.021 ** (0.010) 0.019 * (0.010) 0.030 ** (0.013) 0.037 ** (0.016) 
CEFTA 0.014 (0.009) 0.011 (0.008) 0.016 (0.010) 0.009 (0.008) 
Common language    0.001 (0.006)    -0.010 (0.010) 
Neighbours 0.010 (0.007) 0.008 (0.007) -0.012 (0.010) -0.004 (0.008) 
Tradebloc    -0.002 (0.011)    -0.034 * (0.020) 
Common colony -0.004 (0.016) -0.006 (0.014) 0.066 ** (0.026) 0.061 ** (0.027) 
CDM projects 0.005 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) -0.002 (0.004) 0.001 (0.003) 
GEF funding 0.005 (0.004) 0.003 (0.003) 0.006 (0.005) 0.005 (0.004) 
Development aid -0.004 (0.004) -0.006 (0.004) 0.006 (0.005) 0.004 (0.004) 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 1122  1122  938  938   
Years 12  12  10  10   
log likelihood -137.7  -136.0  -109.6  -106.7   
AIC 333.4  340.0  273.2  277.5   
BIC 479.0  510.8  404.0  433. 5   
a: dy/dx: Marginal effects at mean values of all other independent variables 
b: SE: standard error 
c: For these variables the 2009 values have been extrapolated 
d: Significance levels: * = p-value <0.1, ** = p-value <0.05, *** = p-value <0.01  
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Table S4b: Full models compared to parsimonious models (financial incentives and framework 
policies) 
 Financial incentives 
(parsimonious model) 
Financial incentives    
(full model) 
Framework policies 
(parsimonious model) 
Framework policies    
(full model) 
 dy/dxa  SEb dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE 
Domestic determinants 
Domestic energyc -0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) -0.003 (0.004) -0.003 (0.003) 
GDP per capita 0.009 **d (0.003) 0.006 (0.004) 0.010 (0.008) 0.011 (0.010) 
Populationc 0.007 *** (0.003) 0.007 *** (0.003) 0.017 *** (0.005) 0.014 *** (0.005) 
Education   0.013 (0.012)   0.029 (0.039) 
Hydro resources 0.002 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) -0.006 (0.005) -0.006 (0.005) 
Wind resources 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Solar resources 0.006 * (0.003) 0.007 ** (0.004) -0.008 (0.011) -0.004 (0.011) 
Geothermal res. 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 ** (0.000) -0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
Biomass resources -0.662 (1.029) -0.562 (0.965) -1.899 (2.158) -2.368 (2.172) 
Democracy 0.001 * (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Pollution (SO2)   0.000 (0.000)   -0.001 (0.002) 
Civil society org.   -0.001 (0.002)   0.007 (0.007) 
Veto players -0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) -0.001 (0.004) -0.001 (0.003) 
International determinants 
EU member 0.027 ** (0.012) 0.032 ** (0.016) -0.014 (0.032) -0.001 (0.033) 
CEFTA 0.018 * (0.010) 0.018 * (0.009) 0.045 (0.030) 0.049 * (0.027) 
Common language   0.001 (0.009)   -0.030 (0.028) 
Neighbours 0.008 (0.008) 0.009 (0.008) 0.034 (0.024) 0.036 (0.024) 
Tradebloc   -0.009 (0.015)   -0.016 (0.047) 
Common colony 0.080 ** (0.037) 0.074 ** (0.036) 0.068 * (0.040) 0.068 * (0.037) 
CDM projects 0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 0.023 (0.017) 0.018 (0.017) 
GEF funding 0.004 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) 0.031 * (0.018) 0.025 (0.017) 
Development aid 0.004 (0.005) 0.004 (0.005) 0.003 (0.015) 0.000 (0.013) 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 941   941    864   864   
Years 10   10    12   12   
log likelihood -110.1   -109.3    -185.7   -183.8   
AIC 274.2   282.5    429.3   435.6   
BIC 405.0   437.7    567.4   597.5   
a: dy/dx: Marginal effects at mean values of all other independent variables 
b: SE: standard error 
c: For these variables the 2009 values have been extrapolated 
d: Significance levels: * = p-value <0.1, ** = p-value <0.05, *** = p-value <0.01  
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Table S5: Marginal effects when setting EU=0 and CEFTA=0 (parsimonious models) 
 
 Targets Feed-in-tariffs Financial incentives Framework policies 
 dy/dxa  SEb dy/dx  SE dy/dx  SE dy/dx  SE 
Domestic determinants  
Domestic energyc -0.001  (0.001) -0.003 **d (0.001) -0.001  (0.001) -0.003  (0.003) 
GDP per capita 0.001  (0.002) 0.006 ** (0.003) 0.007 ** (0.003) 0.010  (0.008) 
Populationc 0.006 *** (0.002) 0.004 ** (0.002) 0.006 *** (0.002) 0.016 *** (0.005) 
Hydro resources -0.003 ** (0.002) 0.004 ** (0.002) 0.002  (0.001) -0.005  (0.005) 
Wind resources 0.000 ** (0.000) 0.000  (0.000) 0.000  (0.000) 0.000  (0.000) 
Solar resources 0.001  (0.003) 0.000  (0.003) 0.005 * (0.003) -0.007  (0.011) 
Geothermal res. 0.000  (0.000) 0.000  (0.000) 0.000  (0.000) 0.000  (0.001) 
Biomass resources -1.464  (1.178) 0.463 * (0.259) -0.529  (0.831) -1.854  (2.122) 
Democracy 0.000  (0.000) 0.001  (0.000) 0.001  (0.000) 0.002  (0.001) 
Veto players 0.001  (0.001) -0.001  (0.001) -0.001  (0.001) -0.001  (0.004) 
International determinants  
EU member 0.018 ** (0.010) 0.024 ** (0.010) 0.021 ** (0.010) -0.014  (0.032) 
CEFTA 0.011 * (0.009) 0.013 * (0.007) 0.015 ** (0.007) 0.044  (0.027) 
Neighbours 0.008  (0.007) -0.009  (0.008) 0.006  (0.006) 0.033  (0.023) 
Common colony -0.003  (0.016) 0.054 ** (0.021) 0.064 ** (0.030) 0.066 * (0.038) 
CDM projects 0.004  (0.003) -0.002  (0.003) 0.002  (0.002) 0.022  (0.017) 
GEF funding 0.004  (0.004) 0.005  (0.004) 0.003  (0.003) 0.030 * (0.017) 
Development aid -0.003  (0.004) 0.005  (0.004) 0.003  (0.004) 0.003  (0.014) 
  Year dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
N 1122   938   941   864   
Years 12   10   10   12   
log likelihood -137.7   -109.6   -110.1   -185.7   
BIC 479.0   404.0   405.0   567.4   
a: dy/dx: Marginal effects at mean values of all other independent variables, except EU and CEFTA set at 0. 
b: SE: standard error 
c: For these variables the 2009 values have been extrapolated 
d: Significance levels: * = p-value <0.1, ** = p-value <0.05, *** = p-value <0.01  
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Table S6: Relative importance of domestic and international variables 
 RE Targets          
(parsimonious model) 
Feed-in-tariffs     
(parsimonious model) 
Financial incentives 
(parsimonious model) 
Framework policies 
(parsimonious model) 
 Domestic 
variables 
Internatio-
nal variab. 
Domestic 
variables 
Internatio-
nal variab. 
Domestic 
variables 
Internatio-
nal variab. 
Domestic 
variables 
Internatio-
nal variab. 
N 1122 1122 938 938 941 941 864 864 
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.13 0.19 0.18 0.24 0.16 0.14 0.12 
log likelihood -145.44 -166.43 -122.02 -122.41 -121.75 -133.12 -191.59 -196.66 
AIC 334.87 370.86 284.03 278.83 283.50 300.24 427.18 431.32 
BIC 445.38 466.30 380.91 361.17 380.44 382.64 531.94 521.79 
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Table S7: Coefficients when including diffusion variables separately in models 
 RE Targets               
(parsimonious model) 
RE Targets  
(full model) 
Feed-in-tariffs            
(parsimonious model) 
Feed-in-tariffs  
(full model) 
 dy/dx a SEb dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE 
Language 0.002 (0.007) 0.003 (0.006) -0.019 (0.018) -0.015 (0.017) 
Neighbours 0.010 (0.007) 0.008 (0.006) -0.021 (0.013) -0.020 (0.013) 
Tradebloc 0.003 (0.013) 0.002 (0.010) -0.041 (0.026) -0.043 *c (0.025) 
Common colony -0.003 (0.016) -0.006 (0.013) 0.072 *** (0.027) 0.074 ** (0.029) 
Colonizersd 0.004 (0.004) 0.005 (0.004) -0.008 (0.006) -0.008 (0.005) 
 
 
 Financial incentives 
(parsimonious model) 
Financial incentives    
(full model) 
Framework policies 
(parsimonious model) 
Framework policies  
(full model) 
 dy/dx SE dy/dx SE   dy/dx SE 
Language -0.002 (0.013) 0.000 (0.012) 0.004 (0.032) -0.011 (0.027) 
Neighbours 0.013 (0.010) 0.014 (0.010) 0.040 * (0.023) 0.020 (0.022) 
Tradebloc -0.008 (0.019) -0.010 (0.018) 0.056 (0.049) 0.001 (0.047) 
Common colony 0.084 ** (0.037) 0.082 ** (0.037) 0.087 ** (0.039) 0.051 (0.037) 
Colonizersd 0.008 (0.006) 0.009 (0.006) e   e   
a: dy/dx: Marginal effects at mean values of all other independent variables 
b: SE: standard error 
c: Significance levels: * = p-value <0.1, ** = p-value <0.05, *** = p-value <0.01  
d: Dummy whether adoption by colonizers  
e: Data on adoption of framework policies by colonizers not available 
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Table S8: Coefficients when including further control variables in models 
 RE Targets               
(parsimonious model) 
Feed-in-tariffs            
(parsimonious model) 
Financial incentives 
(parsimonious model) 
Framework policies 
(parsimonious model) 
 dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE dy/dx SE 
Environmental preferences       
Green Party (dummy) 0.001 (0.004) -0.000 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) -0.012 (0.014) 
Protected areasa -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
Environmental groups       
ENGOsa -0.005 (0.004) 0.000 (0.001) -0.003 (0.002) -0.000 (0.004) 
Greenpeace members -0.008 (0.006) -0.009 (0.006) -0.002 (0.005) -0.013 (0.023) 
Energy dependence         
Diesel pricea 0.004 (0.005) 0.015 * (0.008) 0.006 (0.008) -0.008 (0.021) 
Oil priceb 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) 
Unitary vs. federal states         
Unitary s. (dummy) 0.000 (0.004) 0.001 (0.005) 0.004 (0.003) -0.005 ** (0.003) 
International diffusion         
EU (chang. over time) 0.017 (0.011) -0.004 (0.011) 0.022 * (0.012) -0.035 (0.047) 
L1-3.GEF (dummy) 0.005 (0.004) 0.006 (0.005) 0.004 (0.004) 0.031 * (0.018) 
GEF (dummy) -0.005 (0.007) 0.001 (0.006) -0.002 (0.007) 0.029 (0.021) 
L1.GEF (dummy) 0.007 (0.005) 0.010 (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) 0.039 (0.024) 
L2.GEF (dummy) -0.004 (0.007) -0.002 (0.007) 0.003 (0.005) 0.036 (0.026) 
L3.GEF (dummy) 0.009 (0.006) 0.005 (0.007) -0.002 (0.006) -0.018 (0.037) 
L4.GEF (dummy) 0.003 (0.008) Predicts failure perf. 0.006 (0.007) 0.018 (0.040) 
L5.GEF (dummy) Predicts failure perf. 0.011 (0.010) -0.010 (0.010) Predicts failure perf 
L6.GEF (dummy) 0.016 (0.010) 0.017 (0.011) 0.005 (0.008) Predicts failure perf 
L1-3.CDM (dummy) 0.005  (0.003) -0.002  (0.004) 0.002  (0.003) 0.023  (0.017) 
CDM (dummy) 0.011 * (0.006) 0.003 (0.006) -0.003 (0.005) 0.035 (0.024) 
L1.CDM (dummy) 0.003 (0.005) -0.012 (0.011) 0.004 (0.006) 0.060 ** (0.029) 
L2.CDM (dummy) 0.013 * (0.007) -0.003 (0.011) -0.003 (0.006) 0.035 (0.040) 
L3.CDM (dummy) 0.007 (0.008) 0.002  (0.003) 0.010 (0.008) Predicts failure perf 
a: Reduces sample size, and data only for 2010 (is assumed to be the same in other years) 
b: Here, year dummies are excluded but year (to proxy linear trend) is included 
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Table S9: Sample representativeness: Correlation and t-test results between included and 
excluded countries 
 
 
Year 1999 
(most countries in dataset) 
Year 2009 
(last year of the dataset) 
 
Correlation of 
inclusion dummy 
with variables a 
p-value b 
Correlation of 
inclusion dummy 
with variables a 
p-value b 
Target adoption 0.06 0.46  0.10 0.30  
Tariff adoption 0.06 0.46  -0.03 0.77  
Incentive adoption c   0.03 0.71  
Framework adoption 0.04 0.62  -0.11 0.36  
Domestic energy 0.04 0.58  0.13 0.13  
GDP per capita -0.02 0.81  0.01 0.93  
Population 0.55 0.00 *** 0.55 0.00 *** 
Education -0.07 0.38  -0.07 0.37  
Hydro resources 0.01 0.88  0.01 0.88  
Wind resources -0.16 0.05 * -0.16 0.05 * 
Solar resources -0.20 0.01 ** -0.20 0.01 * 
Geothermal resources 0.11 0.20  0.11 0.20  
Biomass resources 0.12 0.13  0.13 0.10  
Democracy 0.11 0.24  0.00 0.97  
Pollution (SO2) -0.11 0.17  -0.11 0.17  
Civil society org. 0.42 0.00 *** 0.41 0.00 *** 
Veto players 0.14 0.10  -0.10 0.24  
EU member 0.12 0.12  0.12 0.12  
CEFTA 0.01 0.93  0.01 0.92  
Language 0.05 0.55  -0.01 0.94  
Neighbours 0.15 0.05 * 0.28 0.00 *** 
Tradebloc 0.23 0.00 *** 0.17 0.03 * 
Common colony -0.11 0.18  -0.30 0.00 *** 
CDM projects c   0.28 0.00 *** 
GEF funding 0.13 0.10 * 0.08 0.32  
Development aid 0.29 0.00 *** 0.26 0.00 *** 
a: pair-wise Spearman correlation coefficients   
b: p-values for both Spearman correlation coefficients and t-test comparing the means of included 
and excluded  countries; * = p-value <0.1, ** = p-value <0.05, *** = p-value <0.01   
c: no correlation coefficient as variables have all value of zero in this year 
 
 
